A Social Network Analysis of Occupational Segregation by Buhai, I.S. (Sebastian) & Leij, M.J. (Marco) van der
TI 2006-016/1 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 
 
A Social Network Analysis of 
Occupational Segregation 
 Sebastian Buhai1,2 
Marco van der Leij1 
1 Erasmus University Rotterdam, and Tinbergen Institute; 
2 Aarhus School of Business. 
 
  
Tinbergen Institute 
The Tinbergen Institute is the institute for 
economic research of the Erasmus Universiteit 
Rotterdam, Universiteit van Amsterdam, and Vrije 
Universiteit Amsterdam. 
 
Tinbergen Institute Amsterdam 
Roetersstraat 31 
1018 WB Amsterdam 
The Netherlands 
Tel.: +31(0)20 551 3500 
Fax: +31(0)20 551 3555 
 
Tinbergen Institute Rotterdam 
Burg. Oudlaan 50 
3062 PA Rotterdam 
The Netherlands 
Tel.: +31(0)10 408 8900 
Fax: +31(0)10 408 9031 
 
 
Please send questions and/or remarks of non-
scientific nature to driessen@tinbergen.nl. 
Most TI discussion papers can be downloaded at 
http://www.tinbergen.nl. 
A Social Network Analysis of Occupational
Segregation∗
Sebastian Buhai† and Marco van der Leij‡
January 27, 2006
Abstract
This paper proposes a simple social network model of occupational
segregation, generated by the existence of inbreeding bias among individ-
uals of the same social group. If network referrals are important in getting
a job, then expected inbreeding bias in the social structure results in dif-
ferent career choices for individuals from different social groups, which
further translates into stable occupational segregation equilibria within
the labour market. Our framework can be regarded as complementary to
existing discrimination or rational bias theories used to explain persistent
observed occupational disparities between various social groups.
JEL codes: A14, J31, J70, Z13
Keywords: Social Networks, Occupational Segregation, Labour Mar-
ket
1 Introduction
Occupational segregation between various social groups is a persistent and per-
vasive phenomenon in the labour market. Richard Posner recently pointed out
that ”a glance of the composition of different occupations shows that in many
of them, particularly racial, ethnic, and religious groups, along with one or
the other sex and even groups defined by sexual orientation (heterosexual vs.
homosexual), are disproportionately present or absent”1. There are countless
∗We greatly benefited from useful suggestions and discussions, at different stages of this
paper, from Sanjeev Goyal, Maarten Janssen, James Montgomery, Gilles Saint-Paul and
audiences in seminars and conferences at University College London, Tinbergen Institute
Amsterdam, Tinbergen Institute Rotterdam, WEHIA 2005 at the University of Essex and
SMYE 2005 in Geneva. The usual disclaimers apply.
†Tinbergen Institute, Erasmus University Rotterdam and Aarhus School of Business, email
buhai@tinbergen.nl
‡Tinbergen Institute and Erasmus University Rotterdam; email mvanderleij@few.eur.nl
1The quote is from an entry in ”The Becker-Posner Blog”, see http://www.becker-posner-
blog.com. Posner also gives an example of gender occupational segregation: ”a much higher
percentage of biologists than of physicists are women, and at least one branch of biology,
primatology, appears to be dominated by female scientists. It seems unlikely that all sex-
related differences in occupational choice are due to discrimination...”
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empirical studies that investigated the measurement and extent of occupational
segregation, both in sociology and in economics2, documenting its enduring rele-
vance. Most studies analysing possible causes of occupational segregation agree
that pure taste discrimination or theories based on market factors cannot ex-
plain alone occupational disparities. While a few alternative candidate theories
have been considered 3, Arrow (1998) particularly indicated the concepts of di-
rect social interaction and networks as most promising avenues for research in
this context.
In this paper we apply social network theory to dynamically model occupa-
tional segregation in the labour market. Significant progress has been achieved
in modeling labor market phenomena by means of social network analysis. Re-
cent articles have investigated the effect of social networks on employment, wage
inequality, labour market transitions, social welfare etc 4. To our knowledge this
is however the first application of social network analysis to modelling occupa-
tional segregation.
We construct a very simple three-stage model of occupational segregation
between two homogeneous, exogenously defined, social groups acting in a 2-job
labor market. In the first stage each individual chooses one of the two specialized
educations to become a worker. In the second stage individuals randomly form
friendship ties with other individuals, with a tendency to form more ties with
individuals from the same social group, what we call inbreeding bias. In the
third stage workers use their friendship contacts to search for jobs.
We show that with a positive inbreeding bias a complete polarization in terms
of occupations across the two groups can arise as a stable equilibrium outcome.
We extend our model by allowing for ‘good’ and ‘bad’ jobs, to analyze wage and
unemployment inequality between the two social groups. We show that with
large differences in job attraction a natural outcome of the model is that one
group specializes in the good job, while the other group mixes over the jobs.
Further, the group that specializes in the good job has a lower unemployment
rate and a higher payoff. Thus our model is able to explain typical empirical
patterns of gender, race or ethnical inequality.
In the remainder of this paper we review some empirical evidence on the ex-
istence of inbreeding bias and occupational segregation in Section 2, we describe
our model of occupational segregation in Section 3, and we discuss the results
2Among the numerous studies documenting gender or racial occupational segregation, we
mention a few that also have detailed literature review sections: Albeda (1986), Jacobs and
Lim (1992), Blau, Simpson and Anderson (1998), Rich (1999)
3Theories advanced for explaining segregation in general and inequality among various
social groups include a. pure discrimination theories, eg. Becker (1957), Arrow (1972a);
b. various statistical discrimination theories, eg. Phelps (1972) , Arrow (1972b), Lazear and
Rosen (1990), Coate and Loury (1993); c. theories based on intrinsic differences in ability or in
attachment to the labour market, such as the human capital model by eg. Polachek (1981) ; d.
theories based on group membership/ identity, adopted mainly from the residential segregation
literature, eg. the review by Durlauf (2003) e. theories based on personal identity” developed
by Akerlof and Kranton (2000)
4See for instance Montgomery (1991), Arrow and Borzekowski (2003), Calvo´-Armengol and
Jackson (2003, 2004), Bramoule and Saint-Paul (2004), Fontaine (2004), Lavezzi & Meccheri
(2004).
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on segregation in Section 4. We then derive results when jobs are not equally
attractive in Section 5, and we summarize and conclude the paper in Section 6.
2 Evidence on Job Contact Networks and In-
breeding Bias
There is a well established set of stylized facts that show the importance of the
informal job networks in searching and finding jobs. First, it is known that
on average 50-60% of the workers obtain jobs through their personal contacts.
Evidence in this sense comes both from sociology and economics, starting back
in the 1960’s and covering multiple countries, eg. Rees (1966), Granovetter
(1995), Holzer (1987), Staiger (1990), Montgomery (1991), Topa (2001). A
second empirical fact is that on average 40-50% of the employers use social
networks of their current employees (ie. they hire recommended applicants)
to fill their job openings: e.g. Holzer (1987). Third, the employee-employer
matches obtained by making use of job contact networks appear to be of high
quality: there is evidence that those who found jobs through personal contacts
were less likely to quit, e.g. Datcher (1983), Devine and Kiefer (1991), and
also had longer tenure on these jobs, e.g. Simon and Warner (1992)5. For a
more detailed overview of studies on job information networks Ioannides and
Datcher Loury (2004) is a very good reference. Job contact networks are thus
documented to be very relevant in the labour dynamics process of matching
employees to employers.
There is also extensive empirical evidence on the existence of inbreeding
biases within social groups, ie. individuals are more likely to maintain ties
to others within the same group, e.g. Doeringer and Piore (1971), Marsden
(1987), Staiger (1990). Staiger (1990) documents for instance the existence of
large inbreeding biases within gender groups6: over all occupations in a US
sample, about 87% of the jobs obtained through contacts by men were based on
information received from other men and 70% of the jobs obtained informally
by women were based on information from other women. His results are very
similar when looking at each occupation separately or by looking at all or each
industry in part. Evidence from other fields such as social psychology indicates
that in fact membership in exogeneously-defined (where the individual could not
choose its group) group comes with strong intragroup solidarity, even when the
5There is however recent empirical evidence that jobs obtained through networks of per-
sonal contacts are not always better than those obtained through formal means. Using US and
European data Bentolila, Michelacci and Suarez (2004) find that the use of social contacts,
although helping in finding a job faster, can generate mismatches between a worker’s occupa-
tional choice and his comparative productive advantage, leading to individual wage discounts
of 5 to 7%. Pellizarri (2004) using European data finds that wage penalties and wage premi-
ums of jobs obtained through contacts relative to jobs obtained formally are equally frequent
accross countries and industries.
6Intuitively the inbreeding bias by gender is likely to be smaller than inbreeding biases by
social groups differentiated along race or ethnicity, given the possible close-knit relationships
between men and women.
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groups are arbitrary categorized, as documented for instance in the “Robbers
Cave” study by Sherif(1961)7.
Using these stylized facts, we build a simple theoretical model based on so-
cial networks, able to explain stable occupational segregation equilibria without
a need for other ingredients often used in this context. Our model should of
course be seen as complementary to such existing theories in explaining the
empirically observed occupational segregation patterns. While our study has
common elements with theories concerned with group membership used on a
large scale in sociology for explaining general segregation patterns (neighbor-
hood segregation, school segregation, workplace segregation etc), it differs from
these theories by explicitly modelling the dynamic network interaction8.
3 A Model of Occupational Segregation
Consider the following model. A continuum of 2N workers is equally divided
into two social groups, reds (R) and greens (G). They can work in two occu-
pations, A or B. Both occupations require a thorough specialized education
(training), hence a worker cannot work in an occupation if she is not qualified
to do so by having followed one of the educational tracks corresponding to each
of the two occupations. Therefore workers have to choose their education be-
fore they enter the labour market, in other words they have to make a decision
regarding one of their two available career choices.
We consider the following timing:
1. Workers choose one education in order to specialize either in occupation
A or in occupation B;
2. Workers randomly establish ”friendship” relationships, thus forming a net-
work of contacts;
3. Workers participate in the labour market and if they have a job they earn
a wage wA or wB , respectively.
The choice of education in the first stage involves strategic behaviour and
we therefore look for a Nash equilibrium in this stage. The expected payoff of
7 A different literature stream looks at penalties associated with acting differently than
according to the ”behavioral prescriptions” of different social groups. Such studies investigat-
ing the (often negative) peer-pressure effect in one’s social group are for instance the recent
ones on ”acting white” by Austen-Smith and Fryer (2005) and Fryer (2006). This theory can
be seen as alternative to the intragroup inbreeding bias hypothesis we use in here. For our
paper what matters is that a member of a certain social group is more likely to link ties with
members of the same group and that this likelihood is not endogenously determined.
8The precursor of many such studies is the work by Schelling (1971) on emergence of
segregated communities starting from a mild preference of individuals to be in an ethnic
majority in their communities. In fact Schelling’s model starts from similar assumptions as
the ones we use here: two social groups, a stated mild preference in terms of neighbors (this is
somewhat anologous to our inbreeding bias). The whole context and the dynamic modelling
are however very much different.
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a worker’s educational choice given the choices of other workers is determined
by the network formation process in the second stage and by the employment
process in the third stage. We now make these two other stages more specific.
In the second stage the workers form a network of contacts. We assume this
network to be random with an inbreeding bias (also known in the literature as
assortative mixing). That is, we assume that the probability for two workers to
create a tie is p when the two workers are from different social groups; however
when two workers are from the same social group, the probability of creating a
tie is λp with λ > 1. We will refer to two workers that created a tie as “friends”9.
The third stage we envision is that of a dynamic labour process a la Jackson
and Wolinsky (2004) or Bramoulle´ and Saint-Paul (2005), in which employed
workers randomly lose their jobs while unemployed workers search for jobs. Un-
employed workers receive job information either directly, or indirectly through
their friends. The details of such a process are unimportant for our purposes.
However, what is important is that we assume that unemployed workers have a
higher propensity to receive job information when they have more friends with
the same job background, that is, with the same choice of education. By this
we implicitly assume that everybody has the same chance on the formal labour
market, or in other words, that direct job search intensity is exogenously given
for everybody. Since the details of the labour market process are not relevant,
we ignore the precise dynamics and we simply assume that the probability that
one is employed increases in the number of friends with the same education.
Denote ηAi as the number of friends of individual i that are A-educated, and
denote ηBi similarly for the number of friends of i that are B-educated. Further
denote the probability that i becomes employed as si. Then si = s(ηAi ) if i is
A-educated and si = s(ηBi ) if i is B-educated. We assume that s(0) = s0 > 0
and s′(x) > 0 for all x > 0.
The eventual payoff of the workers depends on the employment status in each
period and on the wage they receive. We assume that the wage rate decreases in
the number of workers that choose a particular type of education. The assump-
tion of a decreasing wage when the total number of employed workers increases
can be explained with a simple classical model of a 2-goods economy with Cobb-
Douglas utility functions, and a linear production function with labour as single
input. Intuitively, when more workers are educated as A, more workers are em-
ployed as A. Thus the economy produces more A-products, which have to find
their way to the consumer market. As the market price drops whenever pro-
duction output increases, it follows that, in a competitive product and labour
market, wages drop as well. Thus wages of A (B)-jobs are negatively related
with the number of workers that choose an A (B)-education.
The assumption is formalized as follows.
Assumption 1 Let nA be the total number of workers that are educated as
9We do not consider in our model the complication that individuals of one social group
might have a higher probability of making contacts than members of the other group. There
is evidence that men have a better access to contact networks than women, see for instance
the introductory discussion in Petersen, Saporta and Seidel (2000) and the references therein.
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A and let nB be defined analogously. Define φa = na/2N and φb = nb/2N
as the proportion of workers A or respectively B-educated. Then the wage of
an A-job, wA(φA), (and a B-job, wB(φB)) is decreasing in φA (or φB), and
∀x : wA(x) = wB(x). Further, wA and wB are continuous and
lim
φA↓0
wA(φA) = lim
φB↓0
wB(φB) =∞.
Note that we initially assume that wages for A and B jobs are equal if there
are as many A-educated workers as B-educated workers. In Section 5 we relax
this assumption.
We can now define the payoff of a worker. First, define µR and µG as the
fraction of workers in R (G) that choose education A. Next, denote S(x, y) as
the expected employment probability of i, when a fraction x of i’s own social
group has the same education as i and a fraction y of the other social group has
the same education as i. That is,
S(x, y) =
∞∑
k=0
s(k)f(k|x, y),
where f(k|x, y) is the probability that a worker i has k friends of the same
education, given that a fraction x of i’s social group and a fraction y of the
other social group choose the same education as i.
Then the payoff function of a worker i who is from group R and A-educated
is
ΠRi (A;µR, µG) = wA
(
µR + µG
2
)
S(µR, µG). (1)
Similarly,
ΠRi (B;µR, µG) = wB
(
1− µR + µG
2
)
S(1− µR, 1− µG). (2)
ΠGi (A;µR, µG) = wA
(
µR + µG
2
)
S(µG, µR). (3)
ΠGi (B;µR, µG) = wB
(
1− µR + µG
2
)
S(1− µG, 1− µR). (4)
We note that if there is an inbreeding bias in the social network (λ > 1) and
s′(η) > 0 for η > 0, then for all x > y
S(x, y) > S(y, x),
since a worker is more likely to form a friendship relation with a worker from
its own group, than with a worker from the other group.
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3.1 Equilibrium
We would like to characterize the Nash equilibria in the model above. We are,
in particular, interested in those equilibria in which there is segregation. We
define segregation as follows:
Definition 1 Let µX , X ∈ {R,G} be the fraction of workers in social group
X that choose education A. There is complete segregation if µR = 0 and
µG = 1, or, vice versa, µR = 1 and µG = 0. There is partial segregation if
for X ∈ {R,G} and Y ∈ {R,G}, Y 6= X: µX = 0 but µY < 1, or, vice versa,
µX = 1 but µY > 0 .
In a Nash equilibrium each worker chooses the education that gives the
highest payoff given the education choices of all other workers. Since workers
of the same group are homogenous, a Nash equilibrium implies that if some
worker in a group chooses education A (B), then no other worker in the same
group should prefer education B (A). With this idea in mind we reformulate
the equilibrium concept in a way that turns out to be useful.
Definition 2 Let µX , X ∈ {R,G} be the fraction of workers in social group X
that choose education A. A pair (µR, µG) is an equilibrium if and only if, for
X ∈ {R,G}, the following hold
ΠXi (A;µR, µG) ≤ ΠXi (B;µR, µG) if µX = 0 (5)
ΠXi (A;µR, µG) = Π
X
i (B;µR, µG) if 0 < µX < 1 (6)
ΠXi (A;µR, µG) ≥ ΠXi (B;µR, µG) if µX = 1 (7)
In our initial analysis we often find multiple equilibria. However, some of
these equilibria are not dynamically stable. We therefore use a simple stability
concept based on a standard myopic adjustment process of strategies. That is,
we think of the equilibrium as the outcome of an adjustment process in which
more and more workers revise their education choice if it is profitable to do so
given the choice of the other workers. To be concrete, we consider stationary
points of a dynamic system in which
dµX
dt
= k
(
ΠXi (A;µR(t), µG(t))−ΠXi (B;µR(t), µG(t))
)
.
The stability properties of stationary points in such dynamic systems are well-
known, see e.g. Chiang (1984, p.641-645). We base our definition on these
properties, taking into account that the process might converge to a segregation
equilibrium, thus to the boundaries of the solution space.
Definition 3 Let (µ∗R, µ
∗
G) be an equilibrium and define
G =

∂(ΠRi (A;µ
∗
R,µ
∗
G)−ΠRi (B;µ∗R,µ∗G))
∂µR
∂(ΠRi (A;µ
∗
R,µ
∗
G)−ΠRi (B;µ∗R,µ∗G))
∂µG
∂(ΠGi (A;µ
∗
R,µ
∗
G)−ΠGi (B;µ∗R,µ∗G))
∂µR
∂(ΠGi (A;µ
∗
R,µ
∗
G)−ΠGi (B;µ∗R,µ∗G))
∂µG
.
 (8)
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The equilibrium is stable under the following conditions for X,Y ∈ {R,G},
X 6= Y ;
(i) if µ∗X = 0, then Π
X
i (A;µ
∗
R, µ
∗
G) < Π
X
i (B;µ
∗
R, µ
∗
G);
(ii) if µ∗X = 1, then Π
X
i (A;µ
∗
R, µ
∗
G) > Π
X
i (B;µ
∗
R, µ
∗
G);
(iii) if µ∗X = 0 or 1, and µ
∗
Y ∈ (0, 1), then
∂(ΠYi (A;µ
∗
R, µ
∗
G)−ΠYi (B;µ∗R, µ∗G))
∂µY
< 0;
(iv) if µ∗R ∈ (0, 1) and µ∗G ∈ (0, 1), then
trace(G) < 0 and det(G) > 0.
The equilibrium is weakly stable if the above conditions only hold with weak
inequality signs.
Conditions (i), (ii) and (iii) are applied to segregation equilibria, while con-
dition (iv) is applied to non-segregation equilibria. If an equilibrium is stable,
then the dynamic system converges back to the equilibrium after any small
perturbation. This is not necessarily true for a weak equilibrium.
4 Occupational segregation
We next characterize equilibria for three cases. In the benchmark case network
effects are nonexistent. In the second case network effects are important, but
there is no inbreeding bias in the social network, that is, λ = 1. In the third
case, we consider the full model including network effects and an inbreeding
bias.
4.1 A market without network effects
We first consider a labour market in which the probability to get a job does not
depend on a worker’s social network. That is s(η) = s0. We obtain a standard
result
Proposition 1 Suppose s(η) = s0 ∈ (0, 1]. (µ∗R, µ∗G) is a weakly stable equilib-
rium if and only if
wA
(
µ∗R + µ
∗
G
2
)
= wB
(
1− µ
∗
R + µ
∗
G
2
)
. (9)
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Proof. If s(η) = s0, then equation (9) is equivalent to
ΠXi (A;µ
∗
R, µ
∗
G) = Π
X
i (B;µ
∗
R, µ
∗
G)
for X ∈ {R,G}. Clearly, if (9) holds then (µ∗R, µ∗G) is an equilibrium.
Further, since wA(x) and wB(x) are decreasing in x, it is easy to see that
∂(ΠXi (A; ·)−ΠXi (B; ·))
∂µX
=
∂(ΠXi (A; ·)−ΠXi (B; ·))
∂µY
=
s0
2
(w′A(·) + w′B(·)) < 0
for X,Y ∈ {R,G}, X 6= Y . This implies that for G defined as (8) we have
trace(G) < 0 and det(G) = 0. Hence, all conditions for weak stability are
satisfied.
Moreover any (µ′R, µ
′
G) for which wA > wB cannot be equilibria since then
ΠXi (A;µ
′
R, µ
′
G) > Π
X
i (B;µ
′
R, µ
′
G).
This would only be consistent with an equilibrium if all workers chose A as
education, that is µR = µG = 1. However, in Assumption 1 we have assumed
that wB →∞ if (µR + µG)/2→ 1. Hence, if (µR + µG)/2 = 1, then wA < wB ,
and we have a contradiction.
Similarly in an equilibrium it is not possible that wA(·) < wB(·).
This proposition simply restates the classical view that the price of labor,
wages, are equal to the value of the marginal product of labor. Since workers
are homogenous with respect to their productivity, everyone earns the same
wage and occupational segregation or social inequality does not occur 10. Note
that Proposition 1 does not give a unique equilibrium, but a (convex) set of
equilibria (µ∗R, µ
∗
G) for which wA(·) = wB(·). This is also the reason why each
equilibrium is only weakly stable. After a small perturbation to an equilibrium,
a best response dynamic process as the one described above converges back to
the set for which wA = wB . However, the process does not converge to the
’starting’ equilibrium that was originally perturbed. Thus the equilibria cannot
be strongly stable.
4.2 A labour market with network effects, but without
inbreeding in the social network
We further assume that having a social network is important to get a job.
However, if we do not introduce an inbreeding bias in the network of friendship
relations, the result of Proposition 1 hardly changes. That is, all workers receive
the same payoff.
10Since all workers are indifferent between education A or B, a partial segregation equilib-
rium does exist. However, this equilibrium would be excluded if workers in the same social
group are slightly heterogeneous with respect to their education preferences or their produc-
tivity.
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Proposition 2 Suppose s′(η) > 0, but λ = 1. Then (µ∗R, µ
∗
G) is a weakly stable
equilibrium if and only if
wA
(
µ∗R + µ
∗
G
2
)
S(µ∗R, µ
∗
G) = wB
(
1− µ
∗
R + µ
∗
G
2
)
S(1− µ∗R, 1− µ∗G). (10)
We omit the proof as it is similar to that of Proposition 1.
If we compare Propositions 1 and 2, we notice that the network effects allow
for a difference in the probability to become employed. This also implies that
in the equilibrium there might be a wage difference between A and B-workers.
Thus, while the wage of A-workers might be lower than that of B-workers, this
is compensated by a higher probability of getting a job for A-educated workers.
While there might be wage differences between A and B-workers, segregation
by occupation is not a likely outcome if there is no inbreeding bias in the social
network. Although there exists a weakly stable equilibrium with segregation,
this equilibrium would be ruled out if we would introduce a slight heterogeneity
in the worker’s education preferences or in their productivity.
Perhaps it is slightly surprising that the network effects do not directly
result in segregation. One has to remember that if there is no inbreeding bias
in the social network these network effects, as well as the wages, are group-
independent. Thus the value of an A-education or B-education only depends
on the total number of other workers that choose education A or B, not on the
number of workers choosing A or B in each group. It should then be clear that
there is no reason to expect segregation as the group identity does not matter
in making an education choice.
4.3 A labour market with network effects and a social
network with inbreeding
We now consider the unrestricted version of our labour market model. Our
first observation is that the equilibrium changes drastically, even with a small
amount of inbreeding bias.
Proposition 3 Suppose s′(η) > 0 and λ > 1. A weakly stable equilibrium
(µ∗R, µ
∗
G), in which 0 < µ
∗
R < 1 and 0 < µ
∗
G < 1, does not exist.
Proof. Suppose (µ∗R, µ
∗
G) is a stable equilibrium, and µ
∗
R ∈ (0, 1) and µ∗G ∈
(0, 1). By condition (6)
ΠRi (A;µ
∗
R, µ
∗
G) = Π
R
i (B;µ
∗
R, µ
∗
G) and Π
G
i (A;µ
∗
R, µ
∗
G) = Π
G
i (B;µ
∗
R, µ
∗
G) (11)
Substituting (1)-(4) into (11) and rewriting these equations become
wA(
µ∗R+µ
∗
G
2 )
wB(1− µ
∗
R+µ
∗
G
2 )
=
S(1− µ∗R, 1− µ∗G)
S(µ∗R, µ
∗
G)
=
S(1− µ∗G, 1− µ∗R)
S(µ∗G, µ
∗
R)
. (12)
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Since λ > 1, x > y implies S(x, y) > S(y, x). But this means that if µ∗R > µ
∗
G,
then
S(1− µ∗R, 1− µ∗G)
S(µ∗R, µ
∗
G)
<
S(1− µ∗G, 1− µ∗R)
S(µ∗G, µ
∗
R)
,
which contradicts (12). The same reasoning holds for µ∗R < µ
∗
G. Hence, it must
be that µ∗R = µ
∗
G.
However (µ∗R, µ
∗
G) with µ
∗
R = µ
∗
G cannot be a weakly stable equilibrium. To
see this, suppose that (µ∗, µ∗) with µ∗ ∈ (0, 1) is a weakly stable equilibrium.
Hence ΠXi (A;µ
∗, µ∗) = ΠXi (B;µ
∗, µ∗) for X ∈ {R,G} and trace(G) ≤ 0 and
det(G) ≥ 0, where G is defined in (8). Now for X ∈ {R,G}
∂(ΠXi (A; ·)−ΠXi (B; ·))
∂µX
=
1
2
w′A(µ
∗)S(µ∗, µ∗) + wA(µ∗)S1(µ∗, µ∗)
+
1
2
w′B(µ
∗)S(1− µ∗, 1− µ∗) + wB(1− µ∗)S1(1− µ∗, 1− µ∗),
where Sj(µ, µ) =
∂S(x1,x2)
∂xij
∣∣∣
x1=µ,x2=µ
for j = 1, 2. The cross effect is
∂(ΠXi (A; ·)−ΠXi (B; ·))
∂µY
=
1
2
w′A(µ
∗)S(µ∗, µ∗) + wA(µ∗)S2(µ∗, µ∗)
+
1
2
w′B(µ
∗)S(1− µ∗, 1− µ∗) + wB(1− µ∗)S2(1− µ∗, 1− µ∗),
for Y ∈ {R,G}, Y 6= X.
Since λ > 1, it must be that S1(µ, µ) > S2(µ, µ) for all µ ∈ (0, 1). Therefore,
∂(ΠXi (A; ·)−ΠXi (B; ·))
∂µX
>
∂(ΠXi (A; ·)−ΠXi (B; ·))
∂µY
for X,Y ∈ {R,G}, X 6= Y .
Because trace(G) ≤ 0, it must be that
∂(ΠXi (A; ·)−ΠXi (B; ·))
∂µY
<
∂(ΠXi (A; ·)−ΠXi (B; ·))
∂µX
≤ 0.
But then it is easy to see that det(G) < 0. This contradicts weak stability.
This proposition shows that even with a small inbreeding bias, segregation
by occupation is a natural outcome. At least one social group specializes fully
in one type of occupation. The intuition is that an inbreeding bias in the social
network creates a group-dependent network effect. Thus if in group R slightly
more workers choose A than in group G, then the value of an A-education is
higher in group R than in group G, while the value of a B-education is lower
in group R. Positive feedback then ensures that the initially small differences
in education choices between the two groups widen and widen until at least one
group segregates into one type of education.
While we have shown that in a labour market model with network effects
and inbreeding bias segregation is a natural outcome, the question remains what
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the segregation equilibria look like and whether there can be sustained wage
differences between groups. Depending on the functional form of wA(·) and
wB(·) and s(·) , there could be many equilibria. However, complete segregation
is the most prominent outcome.
Proposition 4 Suppose s′(η) > 0 and λ > 1. Then
(i) (µR, µG) = (1, 0) and (µR, µG) = (0, 1) are stable equilibria.
(ii) if for all x ∈ [0, 1]
wA(x/2)
wB(1− x/2) >
S(1− x, 1)
S(x, 0)
, (13)
and
wA((1 + x)/2)
wB((1− x)/2) <
S(1− x, 0)
S(x, 1)
, (14)
then (µR, µG) = (1, 0) and (µR, µG) = (0, 1) are the only two stable equi-
libria.
Proof. (i) If (15) holds, then
ΠRi (A; 1, 0) > Π
R
i (B; 1, 0) and Π
G
i (A; 1, 0) < Π
G
i (B; 1, 0)
for (µR, µG) = (1, 0). This is clearly a stable equilibrium. The same is true for
(µR, µG) = (0, 1).
(ii) Note that (13) and (14) do not contradict (15). Hence, (µR, µG) = (1, 0)
and (µR, µG) = (0, 1) are both stable equilibria. We only have to show that
there are no other stable equilibria. From Proposition 3 we already know that
(µR, µG) with 0 < µR < 1 and 0 < µG < 1 cannot be a stable equilibrium.
So consider µR = 0. If µG < 1, then (µR, µG) can be an equilibrium only
if ΠG(A; 0, µG) ≤ ΠG(B; 0, µG). However, this is excluded by condition (13).
Similarly, if µR = 1, then µG > 0 is excluded as an equilibrium by condition
(14).
Part (i) shows that complete segregation is always an equilibrium outcome.
That is, one social group specializes in one occupation, and the other group in
the other occupation. Part (ii) establishes sufficient conditions for uniqueness
of a fully segregated equilibrium. To understand these conditions, note that if
all workers would choose A as education, (µR, µG) = (1, 1), then everyone has
an incentive to choose education B, as the wage of B-jobs is infinitely higher.
The conditions (13) and (14) then say that if all green workers would choose
A, then the red workers always have an incentive to choose education B, either
because the wage of B-jobs is in equilibrium higher than that of A-jobs, or the
prospects of finding a B-job are much higher due to the social network effects.
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5 Social Inequality
The discussion above ignores differences in wages and unemployment. In fact,
since we have assumed that A and B jobs are equally attractive, it is easily seen
that under complete segregation there is no wage and unemployment inequality.
However, not only is this in sharp contrast to observed gender and race gaps
in wages and unemployment, it is also not obvious how our result of complete
segregation can be sustained when there are large wage-induced incentives. That
is: why would someone stick to the education choice of her social group when the
wage benefits of choosing the other education are very large? This motivates
us to extend our framework in order to look at the robustness of our results
under wage and employment inequality. We do this by making the following
assumption on the wage function
Assumption 2 For every x ∈ (0, 1), wA(x) > wB(x).
Thus if there are as many A-educated workers as B-educated workers, then
the A-educated workers earn a higher wage. The implicit assumption behind
Assumption 2 is that the marginal utility consumers derive from product A is
larger than the marginal utility from product B. This is a natural assumption
as there is no reason to expect that different products are equally liked.
We derive results on wage and unemployment inequality under Assump-
tion 2. Our first observation is that the proof of Proposition 3 does not depend
on the fact that wA(x) = wB(x) for every x. Hence, this proposition also holds
under Assumption 2.
Proposition 5 Suppose s′(η) > 0, λ > 1 and Assumption 2 holds. A weakly
stable equilibrium (µ∗R, µ
∗
G), in which 0 < µ
∗
R < 1 and 0 < µ
∗
G < 1, does not
exist.
We next characterize the segregation equilibria. We consider two cases;
either the difference between A and B-jobs is relatively small compared to the
social network effect, or the difference is relatively large. We first consider
the case in which the job difference is relatively small. In this case, complete
segregation is the most prominent outcome.
Proposition 6 Suppose s′(η) > 0, λ > 1, Assumption 2 holds and
wA(1/2)
wB(1/2)
<
S(1, 0)
S(0, 1)
. (15)
Then (µR, µG) = (1, 0) and (µR, µG) = (0, 1) are stable equilibria. In these
equilibria,
wA(·) > wB(·),
and, if µX = 1 and µY = 0 for X,Y ∈ {R,G}, X 6= Y , then
ΠXi (A; ·) > ΠYi (B; ·) > ΠYi (A; ·) > ΠXi (B; ·). (16)
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Proof. If (15) holds, then
ΠRi (A; 1, 0) > Π
R
i (B; 1, 0) and Π
G
i (A; 1, 0) < Π
G
i (B; 1, 0)
for (µR, µG) = (1, 0). This is clearly a stable equilibrium. Further, as (µR +
µG)/2 = 1− (µR + µG)/2 = 1/2, it holds that wA > wB . Finally
S(1, 0)wA(1/2) > S(1, 0)wB(1/2) > S(0, 1)wA(1/2) > S(0, 1)wB(1/2),
and this is equivalent to (16).
The same is true for (µR, µG) = (0, 1).
This proposition states that if the difference in wages is not too large, com-
plete segregation is always an equilibrium outcome. Thus one social group spe-
cializes in one occupation, and the other group in the other occupation. Since
the social groups are of equal size, the employment probabilities in the two social
groups are the same. However, since the wage of A is higher in the equilibrium,
the social group that specializes in occupation A obtains a higher payoff than
the other group. Hence, social inequality is a natural outcome of this model.
Interestingly, if some workers make mistakes in their education choice, then
the workers that are the worst off are from the same social group as the workers
that are the best off. Thus, if µR = 1 and µG = 0, then the red workers that
choose A receive the highest wage and have the best employment probabilities.
However, if some of the red workers choose B by mistake, then these red B-
worker are the most disadvantaged, as they earn the lowest wage and have the
lowest employment chances.
We turn next to the case in which wage differentials are large. We have the
following proposition.
Proposition 7 Suppose s′(η) > 0, λ > 1, Assumption 2 holds and
wA(1/2)
wB(1/2)
>
S(1, 0)
S(0, 1)
. (17)
(i) There is no equilibrium with complete segregation.
(ii) There are at least two stable equilibria with partial segregation, in which
either µR = 1 or µG = 1. If µX = 1 for X ∈ {R,G}, then for Y ∈ {R,G},
Y 6= X
ΠXi (A; ·) > ΠYi (B; ·) = ΠYi (A; ·) > ΠXi (B; ·). (18)
Proof. (i) If (17) is true, then for (µR, µG) = (1, 0)
ΠGi (A; 1, 0) > Π
G
i (B; 1, 0). (19)
Thus G-workers would like to deviate by choosing education A, and therefore
(µR, µG) = (1, 0) cannot be an equilibrium. The same holds for (µR, µG) =
(0, 1).
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(ii) As ΠXi (·) is continuous in µG, it follows from equation (19) and Assump-
tion 1 that there must be a µ∗, such that
ΠGi (A; 1, µ
∗) = ΠGi (B; 1, µ
∗),
and
∂(ΠGi (A; 1, µ
∗)−ΠGi (B; 1, µ∗))
∂µG
< 0.
Moreover, S(1, µ∗) > S(µ∗, 1) and S(1− µ∗, 0) > S(0, 1− µ∗), so we have
S(1, µ∗)wA(·) > S(µ∗, 1)wA(·) = S(1− µ∗, 0)wB(·) > S(0, 1− µ∗)wB(·),
and this is equivalent to (18) for X = R and Y = G. As
ΠRi (A; 1, µ
∗) > ΠRi (B; 1, µ
∗),
it is also clear that (µR, µG) = (1, µ∗G) is a stable equilibrium. The same is true
for (µR, µG) = (µ∗, 1).
The proposition makes clear that complete segregation cannot be sustained
if the wage differential is too large. Starting from complete segregation, a large
wage differential gives incentives to the group specialized in B-jobs to switch to
A-jobs. Interestingly, the unsustainable complete segregation equilibrium is then
replaced by a partial equilibrium in which one group specializes in job A, while
the other group has both A and B-workers. As in the previous case of small wage
differentials, the workers of the group specializing in A-jobs receive the highest
payoffs, hence we have again a social inequality outcome. However in this case
the wages of A-workers in the equilibrium are not necessarily higher than that
of B-workers. It is the higher employment rate of the group specializing in A
that makes the difference. The employment rate of the group specializing in
A-jobs is given by S(1, x) where x is the fraction of A workers in the group that
does not specialize. On the other hand the employment rate of the group that
does not specialize is xS(x, 1) + (1− x)S(x, 0). Thus the group that specializes
in the A-job has a lower unemployment rate than the other group.
6 Summary and Conclusions
We have investigated in this paper a simple social network framework where
jobs are obtained through a network of contacts formed stochastically. We have
shown that even with a very small amount of inbreeding bias within each social
group, dynamically stable occupational segregation equilibria will arise. If the
wage differential across the occupations is not too large, complete segregation
will always be sustainable. If the wage differential is large, complete segregation
cannot be sustained, but a partial segregation equilibrium in which one of the
group fully specializes in one type of educations while the other group mixes,
is sustainable. Furthermore, this model is able to explain sustained wage and
unemployment differences between the social groups.
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While our oversimplified model is able to describe patterns of occupational
segregation and inequality, we neither claim nor think that our explanation
should be seen in isolation as the ideal candidate to explain occupational seg-
regation and inequality. Other factors are very likely (and documented) to be
relevant. What is important is to consider our model as complementary to other
frameworks and as possibly accounting for part of the persistent occupational
segregation observed in practice. To this end it is of course important to empir-
ically document in future research how relevant are the mechanisms described
in this paper. Another avenue for future research is to extend the framework to
other very relevant issues, such as the position of minority vs. majority groups,
by looking at the interaction in this context of social groups of different sizes.
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